Special issues relating to corporate governance and family control /
Morck, Randall.
Special issues relating to corporate governance and family control / Randall Morck and Bernard Yeung. - Washington , DC : World Bank, 2004. - 25p ; 27 cm. - Policy research working papers ; no. 3406 . - World Bank. .
Also available online. "Control of corporate assets by wealthy families in economies lacking institutional integrity is common. It has negative implication son corporate governance and adverse macroeconomic effects which it extends across a sufficiently large part of the Country's corporate sector. Morck and Yeung consider the reasons why family control and control pyramids predominate in emerging market economies and in some industrial economies. They also discuss the reasons why widely held freestanding rims predominate in the United States. The authors discuss policies that countries might adopt to discourage family control pyramids, but caution that control pyramids re but one feature of an institutionally deficient economy. A concerted effort to improve a country's institutions is needed before diffuse ownership is desirable. This paper a product of the Global Corporate Governance Forum, Corporat
Includes bibliographical references and index.
Open access.
Corporate governance.
Family corporations--Management.
Family-owned business enterprises--Management.
Special issues relating to corporate governance and family control / Randall Morck and Bernard Yeung. - Washington , DC : World Bank, 2004. - 25p ; 27 cm. - Policy research working papers ; no. 3406 . - World Bank. .
Also available online. "Control of corporate assets by wealthy families in economies lacking institutional integrity is common. It has negative implication son corporate governance and adverse macroeconomic effects which it extends across a sufficiently large part of the Country's corporate sector. Morck and Yeung consider the reasons why family control and control pyramids predominate in emerging market economies and in some industrial economies. They also discuss the reasons why widely held freestanding rims predominate in the United States. The authors discuss policies that countries might adopt to discourage family control pyramids, but caution that control pyramids re but one feature of an institutionally deficient economy. A concerted effort to improve a country's institutions is needed before diffuse ownership is desirable. This paper a product of the Global Corporate Governance Forum, Corporat
Includes bibliographical references and index.
Open access.
Corporate governance.
Family corporations--Management.
Family-owned business enterprises--Management.