Item type | Current library | Home library | Call number | Status | Barcode | |
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Main Campus Library | University of Eastern Africa, Baraton | Spc HG 3881.5 .W57no.3439 (Browse shelf(Opens below)) | Available | 58996 |
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Spc HG 3881.5 .W57no.3398 The scaling-up of microfinance in Bangladesh : | Spc HG 3881.5 .W57no.3409 Enforcement and corporate governance / | Spc HG 3881.5 .W57no.3438 Addressing gender-based violence in the Latin American and Caribbean region : | Spc HG 3881.5 .W57no.3439 Elections, special interests and the fiscal costs of financial crisis / | Spc HG 3881.5 .W57no.3440 Market discipline under systemic risk : | Spc HG 3881.5 .W57no.3441 Policies facilitating firm adjustment to globalization / | Spc HG 3881.5 .W57no.3442 Emerging infrastructure policy issues in developing Countries : |
Also available online.
"Keefer proposes a new approach to explain why the costs of crisis are greater in some countries than in others. He begins with the premise that many crises result others. He begins with the premise that many crises result from the willingness of politicians to cater to special interests at the expense of broad social interests. A parsimonious model predicts that the less costly it is for average citizens to expel politicians, the more veto players there are; the less important are exogenous shocks, and the more difficult it is for politicians and special interests to forge credible agreements, the lower the costs of crisis are. Though these predictions differ from those in the literature, empirical evidence presented shows that they explain the fiscal costs of financial crisis, even after controlling for the financial sector policies believed to contribute most to the efficient pr
Includes bibliographical references.
Open access.
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