Enforcement and corporate governance / Erik Berglof and Stijn Claessens.

By: Contributor(s): Material type: TextTextSeries: Policy research working papers ; no. 3409Publication details: Washington, D. C : World Bank, 2004.Description: 49p ; 27 cmSubject(s):
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"Enforcement more than regulations, laws-on-the-books, or voluntary codes is key to effective corporate governance, at least in transition and developing Countries. Corporate governance and enforcement mechanisms are intimately linked as they affect firms' ability to commit to their stakeholders, in particular to external investors. Berglof and Claessens provide a framework for understanding instructional contexts. when the general enforcement environment is weak and specific enforcement mechanisms function poorly, as in many developing and transition Countries, few of the traditional corporate governance mechanisms are effective. The principal consequence in these Countries is a large blockholder, but there are important potential costs to this mechanism. A range of private and public enforcement 'tools' can help reduce these costs and reinforce other supplementary corporate gove

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