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Microfinance games [electronic resource] / Xavier Gine ...[et al.].

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Computer fileSeries: Policy research working papers (Online) ; 3959.Publication details: [Washington, D.C. : World Bank, 2006]Description: 46 p. ill. 22 cmSubject(s):

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HG3881.5.W57

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Abstract: "Microfinance has been heralded as an effective way to address imperfections in credit markets. But from a theoretical perspective, the success of microfinance contracts has puzzling elements. In particular, the group-based mechanisms often employed are vulnerable to free-riding and collusion, although they can also reduce moral hazard and improve selection. The authors created an experimental economics laboratory in a large urban market in Lima, Peru and over seven months conducted 11 different games that allow them to unpack microfinance mechanisms in a systematic way. They find that risk-taking broadly conforms to predicted patterns, but that behavior is safer than optimal. The results help to explain why pioneering microfinance institutions have been moving away from group-based contracts. "--World Bank web site.

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Item type	Current library	Home library	Call number	Status	Barcode
Books	Main Campus Library	University of Eastern Africa, Baraton	Spc HG 3881.5 .W57 (Browse shelf(Opens below))	Available	64881

Title from PDF file as viewed on 8/23/2006.

Includes bibliographical references.

"Microfinance has been heralded as an effective way to address imperfections in credit markets. But from a theoretical perspective, the success of microfinance contracts has puzzling elements. In particular, the group-based mechanisms often employed are vulnerable to free-riding and collusion, although they can also reduce moral hazard and improve selection. The authors created an experimental economics laboratory in a large urban market in Lima, Peru and over seven months conducted 11 different games that allow them to unpack microfinance mechanisms in a systematic way. They find that risk-taking broadly conforms to predicted patterns, but that behavior is safer than optimal. The results help to explain why pioneering microfinance institutions have been moving away from group-based contracts. "--World Bank web site.