000			01792nam a2200289 a 4500
001			rea00032453
005			20190704021426.0
008			s2004 wau e 001 0 eng d
035			_z58996
039			_a32448 _cTLC
100	1		_aKeefer, Philip.
245	1	0	_aElections, special interests and the fiscal costs of financial crisis / _cPhilip Keefer.
260			_aWashington, D.C : _bWorld Bank, _c2004.
300			_a48p ; _c27 cm.
440		0	_aPolicy research working papers ; _vno. 3439
500			_aAlso available online.
500			_a"Keefer proposes a new approach to explain why the costs of crisis are greater in some countries than in others. He begins with the premise that many crises result others. He begins with the premise that many crises result from the willingness of politicians to cater to special interests at the expense of broad social interests. A parsimonious model predicts that the less costly it is for average citizens to expel politicians, the more veto players there are; the less important are exogenous shocks, and the more difficult it is for politicians and special interests to forge credible agreements, the lower the costs of crisis are. Though these predictions differ from those in the literature, empirical evidence presented shows that they explain the fiscal costs of financial crisis, even after controlling for the financial sector policies believed to contribute most to the efficient pr
504			_aIncludes bibliographical references.
506			_aOpen access.
650		0	_aElections.
650		0	_aFinancial crises.
650		0	_aFiscal policy.
710	2		_aWorld Bank.
949			_aBSPC _bSPC _cHG3881.5 _d.W57no.3439 _g58996 _5N
961			_t1
999			_c25357 _d25357