000			01777nam a2200277 a 4500
001			rea00032455
005			20190704021745.0
008			s2004 wau e 001 0 eng d
035			_z58998
039			_a32450 _cTLC
100	1		_aBerglof, Erik.
245	1	0	_aEnforcement and corporate governance / _cErik Berglof and Stijn Claessens.
260			_aWashington, D. C : _bWorld Bank, _c2004.
300			_a49p ; _c27 cm.
440		0	_aPolicy research working papers ; _vno. 3409
500			_aAlso available online.
500			_a"Enforcement more than regulations, laws-on-the-books, or voluntary codes is key to effective corporate governance, at least in transition and developing Countries. Corporate governance and enforcement mechanisms are intimately linked as they affect firms' ability to commit to their stakeholders, in particular to external investors. Berglof and Claessens provide a framework for understanding instructional contexts. when the general enforcement environment is weak and specific enforcement mechanisms function poorly, as in many developing and transition Countries, few of the traditional corporate governance mechanisms are effective. The principal consequence in these Countries is a large blockholder, but there are important potential costs to this mechanism. A range of private and public enforcement 'tools' can help reduce these costs and reinforce other supplementary corporate gove
506			_aOpen access.
650		0	_aCorporate governance.
650		0	_aCorporate governance _xDeveloping Countries.
700	1		_aClaessens, Stijn, jt. author.
710	2		_aWorld Bank.
949			_aBSPC _bSPC _cHG3881.5 _d.W57no.3409 _g58998 _5N
961			_t1
999			_c25651 _d25651